Adapted from Chapter 15 of my book Chasing Black Unicorns. After leaving Jovago I founded HotelOga, software for African hotels. Names of some people in the book were changed.
Biruk’s CV was so amazing that I immediately wanted to frame it and hang it in my office. He came to the interview in an expensive suit and shoes, with a gold watch on his wrist, and the vision he conjured up made me want to shine those shoes for him. A perfect American accent. A CV with a big investment bank, the World Bank, and a few months at the group I had just left. I had been looking for someone to deal with investors, and after fifteen minutes I knew I had my man. In my head he was already vice-president of financial affairs, operational affairs and Jesus Christ, Our Lord and Savior.
When I asked why his stint at that group was so short, he said he had been hired as a director of operations for one project and left once he had set up the processes. I believed him because I wanted to believe him.
That sentence is the whole story of how I nearly lost a company.
A company that moved faster than it could be controlled
My idea was to be a middleman to the middlemen: sit between hotels and online travel agents and touch every online booking in Africa, whichever agent made it. For the hotels, HotelOga (“oga” is Nigerian for boss, and always respectful) was free software that filled in bookings automatically, tracked occupancy and costs, and ran on a smartphone. In return we took a small percentage of each transaction.
It worked, faster than I expected. My old friend Maciek, from whom I had learned the internet business, came in as partner and ran technology from Poland. I ran sales from Nigeria. Together we put in $100,000, and with an Indian investor, Ramesh, and a Polish fund, SpeedUp, we had half a million dollars within two months. Within three months we had 500 hotels.
Then the local travel agencies, who I had thought would be the easy part, refused to join. As one of their CEOs told me, none of them was going in: my project would speed up the arrival of the foreign giants. So I invited the giants myself. Booking.com, Expedia, TripAdvisor and others all came on board. But half of our expected income had evaporated, and money meant to last two years would last nine months.
I chose to race forward, in spite of the market, and raise a Series A of two million dollars. I contacted 150 companies and pitched over thirty of them face to face. All of them wanted to talk. None wanted to invest. With hindsight, I should have sold us as a Polish-Nigerian company specializing in emerging markets, not a Nigerian one that would conquer Africa.
I worked all the time, slept little, paid myself nothing and covered many costs from my own pocket. Ramesh started to play up, demanding ever more reporting, as if we were already a multimillion enterprise, and could not understand why I was flying around looking for investors. SpeedUp understood start-ups. Ramesh wanted us to run like his family business. With fifteen people, we trusted each other and had skipped many formalities. You can sort them out later, right? Wrong.
The Messiah
Biruk would be vice-president, deal with finance and investor reports, and take over my talks with investors. He would put in $20,000 of his own money and stay at least six months, after which he would get 5% of HotelOga, and another 10% if he raised at least $2 million. With the company valued at ten million, that was nearly $1.5 million for six months of work. Every dollar counted, so I agreed.
Not everyone was convinced. A marketing man I had brought over from Jovago said: “Such a successful guy, and he wants to work for a failing start-up? Maybe you should call someone.” I told him I knew what I was talking about. Today he greets me on Skype with the same words every time: “Hi Marek, didn’t I tell you so?” Nobody on earth annoys me as much.
Maciek didn’t take to Biruk and resisted showing him our system. He has better intuition than I do, and I didn’t listen. We had a company to save. I gave Biruk our financials, bank statements and databases, introduced him to every investor, and let him give orders to my people without me. Full transparency and trust.
Four months, fifty pages
The result of Biruk’s work was a 50-page business plan full of corporate jargon, an even more complicated Excel budget, and a lot of self-praise at monthly meetings. No investors. Ramesh stopped phoning me at 6 a.m., which I enjoyed, because by then we had had a terrible row. I had shouted at him, forgetting I was talking to an investor. I told him he didn’t understand tech and I got personal about his money and his family. Words can hurt, and I’m good at verbal martial arts. Ramesh had an enormous ego and took insults badly. I was about to learn that he never forgave them.
Biruk organized not one meeting with investors from his own network. At the eleventh hour I found another Indian investor myself, who put in $100,000 and gave us a few more months. What Biruk did push was this: first, moving us out of our office into a co-working space just opened by a friend of his. I refused, because my people felt fine there.
Second, scrapping our factoring arrangement, the fast loans against bookings from some old friends from Rocket that kept us alive because we had no cash buffer and could never get a bank loan. Biruk called it an unnecessary expense and said a friend of his would lend us money cheaper.
That was too much. I told him I hadn’t hired him to bring in his friends, that since he’d arrived the only ones putting capital into the company were me, our new investor and the factoring partners, and that he should bring us an investor or we were done.
“How dare you speak to me like that! We’ll see what Ramesh has to say about this.”
That was news to me. I had introduced them, and I hadn’t known they were so close. I had a hunch.
“You know, Biruk, you’re right. I’m sorry,” I said calmly. “I’ll take back what I said about firing you if you don’t get down to work.”
“I think next time you’ll think twice before speaking to me like that.”
“I’m firing you right now.”
I told him he had not delivered the one thing he was hired for, that I would return his money, but that he had no claim to shares for work he had not done. Then I went out to phone Maciek, because I shouldn’t have sacked him without my partner’s agreement.
“Listen,” I said meekly, “I’ve just fired Biruk.”
“Jeeesus, why did it take so long!”
What I found
The next day Biruk did not come to work. Neither did two employees who had been helping him with “finances”. None answered emails or phones. I started digging through emails. For a long time the three had been meeting outside the office, and none of it appeared in any report. Then I found an email sent from the company mailbox, one that I had the right to read, to Biruk and Ramesh. Its subject was: “Stuff we can use against Marek to remove him from the board.”
The attached report was full of half-truths. It treated as suspicious, for example, that a payment from Expedia had arrived in our Polish account rather than the Nigerian one, when HotelOga was two companies and every dollar later arrived in Nigeria. Our external auditor, recommended by Ramesh, reviewed our cash flow monthly and never flagged anything.
I called a friend who had been a financial director at my old group. “Marek, we let him go after a couple of months, when we figured out that all he could do was talk. Don’t tell me you were taken in by him too?” I said the line was breaking up and hung up, embarrassed. How could I have been so blind?
Putting the pieces together, I concluded that Biruk had phoned Maciek and promised him extra shares if he helped remove me from the board. He had deliberately avoided finding an investor, so that the company would hit a wall and he could ride in as the savior. Maciek, of course, stayed with me. The next day Ramesh wrote to say that Biruk was now his representative and everything had to go through him.
I had only myself to blame, after the last conversation I had with Ramesh. I learned that Biruk had worked on his sense of suspicion. He told Ramesh that we planned to sell the business secretly and run off with the money, a sort of Nigerian anti-scam: instead of a lawyer emailing you about an inheritance, a Pole taking the money out of Nigeria. Ramesh bought it hook, line and sinker, because he wanted to believe it, just as I had believed in Biruk because I wanted and needed to believe it.
Again it was Maciek who saved the situation. Ramesh would speak only to him, and Maciek told him about Biruk’s four months and about how I was busting my ass for the company, and that I regretted what I had said. Ramesh withdrew Biruk’s authority. I promised not to take revenge on Biruk. Karma would deal with that.
The mirror in the Cape Town hotel
We were broke. Neither Maciek nor I had been paid in a year, and my own investment was already double what I had initially put in. I had not paid the staff for two months. A Kenyan start-up with Norwegian owners, Safari Sunset, had agreed to merge 50-50. Then its CEO smelled our blood and changed the offer to 80/20 in their favor. It was a takeover, and it would collide with what we had agreed with Ramesh.
So I did a “Tour de Despair” and reactivated every contact I still had. In Cape Town I met the founder of a large South African software firm, Helen, who had been watching us less for our software than for our hotel contracts and Nigerian team.
Back in the hotel I emailed everyone that I was indefinitely indisposed, ordered a burger and a glass of wine (alright, a bottle), and turned the mirror in the room into a blackboard. The plan I wrote on it: the South African firm buys the Nigerian team and the hotel contracts, pays off the company’s debts and calms the travel agents. The cash left over lets us buy Ramesh out or at least pay him. The Norwegians merge with what they wanted most, the technology and the Polish programmers. A new parent company in Dubai gets shares from everyone. And the Nigerian company stays out of Nigeria for a year. I would step back to being a passive investor. The South Africans wanted a 10% deposit, backed by my personal guarantee.
“Marek, get a couple of hours of sleep,” Maciek wrote. “Tomorrow is the most important day.”
I thought the plan had a one-in-a-million chance, but such plans sometimes succeed. SpeedUp and the Indian investor said: “We trust you know what you’re doing, we’re in favor.” After six hours on the phone, the South African firm said yes. The Norwegians balked at the year-long ban on Nigeria. At 6 p.m. I told them it was non-negotiable, and that if they did not call back by 8, my proposal was withdrawn. Then I hung up. I was bluffing. “Are you sure you did the right thing?” Maciek asked. “Of course I am,” I wrote. Of course I wasn’t. I spent two hours trying to watch YouTube videos and could not focus for fifteen seconds.
The phone rang at 8:01 p.m. “We have a deal. Send us the contract. Today is Friday, we’ll send changes on Monday.” I slept properly that weekend, the first time in months.
Monday, 7 a.m.
On Sunday evening I was already planning to pay salaries on Monday, and to call Ramesh, apologize for my hurtful words and hear him do the same. I imagined we all lived happily ever after.
Monday, 7 a.m., an email from Ramesh’s lawyers: “Information concerning the legal conflict between Marek Zmysłowski and Ramesh regarding control of the company and a call to abandon any business talks with HotelOga.” It included accusations from that report. It had gone to every investor and every partner Biruk knew about, because I had given him the list myself: travel agents, Booking.com, Expedia, Travelstart, SpeedUp. It said Ramesh was convinced this was attempted fraud, and that he would hold to account, legally and publicly, anyone who made a deal with me or HotelOga without his agreement.
That evening Helen called. “Marek, we’re a big company, with a lot of money and a reputation to protect. If somebody sues us, we’d be happy to settle for a sum greater than his entire investment.” Her company was out. I had needed only a few more hours to send Ramesh the good news, and he had read my silence as scheming against him.
I had to let people go and end our hotel contracts. The Nigerian team found jobs easily; the best were taken by the South Africans, who no longer had to pay anything for them. HotelOga was almost worthless. Safari Sunset completed the merger regardless, but the shares granted to Maciek and the two developers in the Dubai company were a fraction of a percent. Emotionally exhausted, I divided my own shares into three and sold them to the developers for a token fee, so they would have a say and their motivation back. My only request was that shares stay reserved for Ramesh. Whatever he had done, he was a shareholder, and I had no right to take them.
I paid all of HotelOga’s debts from my own pocket and returned the South Africans’ deposit. For everyone, HotelOga was Zmysłowski and Zmysłowski was HotelOga. My reputation mattered to me. I am in Africa for the long haul.
What I took from it
- I lost my investor’s goodwill in one phone call, by turning business into a personal insult. People with big egos do not forget.
- I never made the one phone call to a mutual contact, and it would have saved me months. Check references, especially when you badly want the answer to be yes.
This is from Chapter 15, “David and Goliath”, of Chasing Black Unicorns. It is a long chapter and this is only one thread of it: in the book you also meet the lawyer’s letter from my old employer that started it, the Jet Ski club, and how HotelOga got going. All of my income from the book goes to the MaYa Foundation.
Listen to this chapter: Polish audiobook on YouTube (English version coming soon) · Spotify



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